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THE ENLISTED RANKS IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

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January, 1978

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1. The Enlisted Ranks in the All-Volunteer Army
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THE ENLISTED RANKS IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

Since January, 1973, the United States has sought to accomplish what it has never attempted before -- to maintain over two million persons on active military duty on a voluntary basis. Five years after the end of conscription, the all-volunteer force has been analyzed, attacked, and defended in a seemingly endless series of books, reports, articles, and Congressional hearings. The commentators tend to divide into two groups. On the one side, there are those who convey their belief that the all-volunteer force is a success which at most requires only certain changes in personnel management policies. On the other, there are those who see little prospect of a viable defense force short of returning to a form of compulsory military service. I place myself in neither camp.

This study focuses on that component of the all-volunteer force which relied most directly on the draft -- the enlisted ranks of the Army; and it is this part of the military system where the outcomes of all-volunteer recruitment are most quickly evident. It is important to stress, however, that all services were beneficiaries of the selective service system. It is estimated that about forty percent of all voluntary accessions into the military in the peacetime years between the wars in Korea and Vietnam were draft motivated. The draft was also the major impetus for recruitment into the ROTC and reserve/guard units. Nevertheless, it is the enlisted ranks of the Army, the largest of the services, which most clearly focus the conditions bearing

upon the viability of the all-volunteer force.

Let me state at the outset that it unfair and a gross exaggeration to characterize the all-volunteer Army as being in a state of crisis. Certainly, Army recruiters have accomplished a task of immense proportions in the all-volunteer era. The Army of the late 1970s, moreover, by many indicators, whether unit effectiveness, disciplinary rates, or race relations, is noticeably improved over the Army of the early 1970s. To place the all-volunteer experience in a more balanced light, however, it would be better to use the immediate pre-Vietnam period as a benchmark rather than 1970-73, the worst times in modern Army history. Furthermore, as the information to be presented will show, enlistment of an Army primarily based on marketplace competition most likely cannot insure a sufficient number of qualified entrants and may well have a corrosive effect on service integrity. To raise questions as to the future viability of the all-volunteer force, however, is not to advocate restoration of conscription. The choices in front of us are not limited to either tinkering with the all-volunteer status quo, on the one hand, or bringing back the draft, on the other. An informed discussion of such choices must be supported by careful sociological analysis, organizational insight, and honest presentation of empirical data. This is the task now before us.

The plan of this study is straight forward. First, data from the end of the draft through 1977 are given on the social background of the Army enlisted ranks. Whenever possible, comparable data are presented from the early 1960s in order to assess demographic trends over two peacetime periods. Second, there is a conceptual overview of organizational trends within the Army

before and after the end of conscription. Though organizational developments vary somewhat between the services, they do share basic commonalities. Third, an account of contemporary enlisted culture is offered. This goes beyond statistical and conceptual formulations by looking at actual enlisted life in the all-volunteer Army. Fourth, there is a discussion of the controversial issue of "representativeness" and how this relates to soldierly performance. Finally, in an effort to counterweigh prevailing econometric analyses of the all-volunteer force, military service in the ranks is linked to broader questions of citizen participation and national service.

I. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Each year since the end of the draft the armed forces have been seeking to recruit between 400,000 and 430,000 enlisted persons, virtually all between the ages of 17 to 21 years old. Of the males in that age bracket, only about a quarter are considered "qualified and eligible," that is, physically, mentally, and morally fit and likely to be available for military service (i.e. excluding full-time students, those already in the military, veterans, or institutionalized).¹ Thus it is calculated that about three in ten qualified and eligible males must be recruited from each annual cohort to maintain an active duty force slightly over two million persons.

The Army has been recruiting between 180,000 and 200,000 enlisted persons annually since 1973. In FY 1977, the Army recruited 181,000 persons of whom 85 percent were non-prior-service males, 7 percent prior-service males, and 8 percent non-prior-service females. On the whole, the number of entrants into

the all-volunteer Army have matched recruitment objectives. It is true that a major shortfall of 23,000 was experienced in FY 1974, the first year of the all-volunteer Army, but recruitment achievements in subsequent years have met or been close to enlistment goals. (In FY 1977, the Army fell 4,000 short of its recruitment target.) The overall size of the Army, however, has been reduced from an active-duty strength averaging 920,000 in the 1960-64 period to 782,000 at the end of FY 1977.

While recruitment objectives in the all-volunteer Army have generally been achieved up to the present, inescapable demographic constraints appear on the immediate horizon. In 1977, some 2.14 million males reached age 18, in 1980 the figure will decline slightly to 2.13 million, and then drop precipitously to 1.8 million by 1985, and 1.7 million by 1990. Inasmuch as the recruitment pool consists overwhelmingly of non-prior-service (NPS) males, this is the group with which most of the ensuing discussion will deal. The increasing role of women in the all-volunteer Army will also draw our attention.

Educational Levels. The educational levels of male enlistees in the all-volunteer Army are markedly lower than either the equivalent civilian population or the Army entrants of 1964, the last peacetime year before the war in Vietnam. (Because of higher draft calls, educational levels of Army accessions increased during the war years of Vietnam.) As reported in Table 1, 43.9 percent of NPS males in FY 1977 did not possess a high school diploma. This compares with 25.4 percent of nineteen-year-old males in the general population, and 28.7 percent of draftees and 39.9 percent of enlistees in 1964. The contrast between the educational levels of the all-volunteer Army

and the peacetime draft Army is more glaring when placed in the context of the overall increase for male high school graduates, aged 18 to 21 years, in the recent past; from 64 percent in 1967 to 72 percent in 1975.² This is to say that while the national trend has been toward improving high-school graduation rates, Army accessions are going the other way.

[Table 1 About Here]

The data given in Table 1 also reveal an even sharper decline in the proportion of Army entrants with some college between the pre- and post-Vietnam periods. Where 17.2 percent of the draftees and 13.9 percent of the enlistees in 1964 had some college, the corresponding figure is 4.9 percent of the FY 1977 enlistees. Not only did the draft directly bring a sizeable college element into the ranks, but it also served as an impetus for draft-motivated volunteers who were educated beyond high school. The 1964 accession data, if anything, understate the infusion of college enlisted men into the ranks of the pre-Vietnam Army. During the small cohort years of the mid-1950s to the early 1960s -- the time when Depression babies had reached military age -- college graduates were more likely to be drafted than in any period since World War II. (Survey data based on 1962 Army entrants show 24.7 percent of draftees had some college.)

Racial Composition. The rising proportion of black entrants has generated more controversy than any other topic in the debate on the all-volunteer force.³ This topic has been particularly sensitive with regard to the Army enlisted ranks. In the early 1960s, blacks accounted for about 12 percent of

Table 1. EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF ARMY MALE ENTRANTS (non-prior service) AND 19-YEAR-OLD AMERICAN MALES.

Educational Level	1964 Draftees	1964 Enlistees	FY 1977 Enlistees	19-Year-Old Males (1976)
Some College	17.2	13.9	4.9	23.0
High School Graduate	54.1	46.2	51.2	51.6
Non-High School Graduate	28.7	39.9	43.9	25.4
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: Accession data from Department of Army statistics; Civilian data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-20, No. 295, p. 59.

Army enlisted entrants, a figure corresponding with the black share of the 18-24 year age group in the total population. During most of the war years in Vietnam, blacks made up about 15 percent of Army accessions. Since the advent of the all-volunteer Army, the proportion of blacks has more than doubled over pre-Vietnam levels. As shown in Table 2, black accessions reached 31.9 percent of NPS males in 1977. Although the number of other minorities is not as reliably tabulated, a figure of at least five percent, principally Hispanic, would be a cautious estimate. In other words, over a third of the men now entering the Army's enlisted ranks are from minority groups.

[Table 2 About Here]

Within the enlisted ranks racial content varies by branch and career management field. The following figures pertain to early 1977.⁴ Black membership in the combat arms is about 24 percent. Thus, even though blacks comprise more than 30 percent of the strength in four divisions and are in the majority in some battalions, it cannot be categorically stated that blacks are overrepresented in the combat arms in terms of total enlisted blacks. Of course, blacks are overly proportionate in the combat arms in relation to their numbers in American society, but this is because whites are underrepresented in the all-volunteer Army. Within the Army, however, it is in support units where racial imbalance is most clearly evident. Blacks tend to be concentrated in low skill fields: 48.5 percent in petroleum handling, 41.7 percent in supply, and 40.2 percent in wire maintenance. Whites, on the other hand, are disproportionately found in such high skill fields as inter-

Table 2. BLACK PROPORTION OF ARMY MALE ENLISTEES (non-prior service).

Year	Percentage Black
1973	26.8
1974	26.5
1975	22.0
1976	27.6
1977 (thru Nov.)	31.9

Source: Department of Army statistics.

cept equipment, signal intelligence, aviation, and electronics.

The changing racial composition of the Army from before the Vietnam War to the present is shown in Table 3. Blacks made up 11.8 percent of enlisted personnel in 1964, 17.5 percent in 1972, and 25.8 percent in mid-1977. Even at senior noncom levels (E7-E9) blacks are considerably better represented in 1977 than at any earlier time. The proportion of black noncoms can be expected to increase further owing to the higher than average reenlistment rate of black soldiers. In FY 1977, reenlistments at the end of the first term, were 48.5 percent for blacks and 30.6 percent for whites.⁵ Blacks continue to be underrepresented at the officer corps at all levels although the direction of change is toward greater black participation. Army projections are for black officer entrants to exceed 20 percent by the end of 1979.⁶ Whether this goal will be achieved remains to be seen, but there certainly has been a sharp rise in newly commissioned black officers since the start of the all-volunteer Army.

[Table 3 About Here]

It is important to stress that the trend toward increasing black content in the Army predates the all-volunteer force. The rising percentage of blacks operates somewhat independently of the end of conscription and can be attributed in part to the dramatic increase in the proportion of blacks eligible for military service, specifically, the increasing number of black high school graduates and the larger percentage of blacks placing in the upper levels of the mental aptitude tests required for service entry.⁷ There is also the com-

Table 3. BLACK PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY BY GRADE

	1964	1972	1977
Officers:			
O-7 and above	--	1.8	2.7
O-6	.2	1.5	3.8
O-5	1.1	5.3	5.0
O-4	3.5	5.0	5.0
O-3	5.1	3.9	5.3
O-2	3.6	3.4	8.1
O-1	2.6	2.2	9.8
Warrant	2.8	4.5	5.9
Total Officers	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>6.1</u>
Enlisted:			
E-9	3.3	8.6	16.3
E-8	5.8	14.4	20.1
E-7	7.9	19.9	24.3
E-6	12.2	23.9	20.7
E-5	14.8	16.9	22.4
E-4	12.5	14.1	25.7
E-3	11.9	16.7	28.8
E-2	11.6	18.5	30.5
E-1	6.4	18.4	29.5
Total Enlisted	<u>11.8</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>25.8</u>

Note: 1964 and 1972 figures as of Dec. 31; 1977 figures as of 31 July.

Source: Department of Army statistics.

bined push of the astoundingly high unemployment rate among black youth and the pull of an institution which has gone further than any other to attack racism.

Race and Education. It is a well recognized fact that the educational levels of blacks in America have trailed far behind that of whites. The trend, however, has been toward a narrowing of the gap. Looking at males age 19 in 1970, for example, 44.1 percent of blacks compared to 12.9 percent of whites had not completed high school. By 1974, the high school dropout rate for blacks had declined to 30.6 percent while the white rate increased to 18.4 percent.⁸ Still even for the more recent figures, black educational attainment contrasts markedly with that of whites.

Contrary to national patterns, however, the intersect of race and education is quite different among male entrants in the all-volunteer Army. Since the end of the draft, the proportion of black high school graduates entering the Army has exceeded that of whites, and this is a trend that is becoming more pronounced. In FY 1977, as shown in Table 4, high school graduates accounted for 60.5 percent of entering blacks compared to 40 percent of entering whites.⁹ In point of fact, today's Army enlisted ranks is the only major arena in American society where black educational levels surpass that of whites, and by quite a significant margin!

[Table 4 About Here]

What may be happening in the all-volunteer Army, I suggest, is something

**Table 4. PERCENTAGE OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES OF ARMY MALE ENLISTEES BY RACE
(non-prior service).**

Fiscal Year	Black	White
1974	47.6	46.2
1975	59.4	46.9
1976*	63.6	47.1
1977	60.5	40.0

* Includes transition quarter July-Sept., 1976.

Source: U.S. Army Recruitment Command.

like the following. Whereas the black soldier is fairly representative of the black community in terms of education and social background, white entrants of recent years are coming from the least educated sectors of the white community. My stays with Army line units also leave the distinct impression that many of our young enlisted white soldiers are coming from non-metropolitan areas. I am even more impressed by what I do not often find in line units -- urban and suburban white soldiers of middle-class origins. In other words, the all-volunteer Army is attracting not only a disproportionate number of minorities, but also an unrepresentative segment of white youth, who, if anything, are even more uncharacteristic of the broader social mix than are our minority soldiers. Though put far too crassly, there is an insight in the assessment given me by a longtime German employee of the U.S. Army in Europe: "In the volunteer Army you are recruiting the best of the blacks and the worst of the whites."

Mental Aptitude Levels. All recruits are classified into mental aptitude levels according to their score on entrance tests, formerly known as the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and more recently as the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The tested population is categorized into percentile groups: I, 100-93; II, 92-65; IIIA, 65-50; IIIB, 49-31; IV, 30-10; and V, 9-0. The Army in competition with the other services seeks to recruit from the average and above portions of the mental aptitude spectrum. (Category V individuals are not eligible to join the services.) By and large, the Army has achieved its goals since the end of the draft. Table 5 shows that close to nine in ten NPS male entrants since FY 1975 have been in category

IIIB or above; and, excepting FY 1977, about half of the entrants were in categories I through IIIA, which constitute the top 50 percentile. Supplementary data show, moreover, that in comparison with the draft Army of the pre-Vietnam period, there has been a decided shift toward the middle mental levels in the all-volunteer Army.¹¹ Category I made up about 8 percent of entrants in the early 1960s compared to 2 percent in the late 1970s; over the same period, category IV entrants decreased from about 17 to 10 percent.

[Table 5 About Here]

The usefulness of mental aptitude scores to evaluate soldierly potential has become intertwined with the controversy over the inappropriate characterization of racial groups by their differential performance on "intelligence" tests.¹⁰ The replacement of the AFQT by the ASVAB was an effort toward elimination of "cultural bias" in earlier tests. As a result, "the observed effect was clearly substantial: the nonblack Category I-III percentage hardly changed, but the black Category I-III percentage increased by nearly 50 percent."¹¹ The appropriateness of using mental aptitude scores to assess the all-volunteer Army presents other difficulties as well. A sophisticated and comprehensive study of racial differences in promotion progress found that black enlisted men had slower promotion rates than their white counterparts even when mental group level was held constant.¹² Also, as will be discussed in detail later, formal educational levels are a much more powerful predictor on almost all measures of enlisted performance than mental group level.

Table 5. MENTAL APTITUDE LEVELS OF ARMY MALE ENLISTEES (non-prior service).

Fiscal Year	I-IIIA	IIIB	IV
1974	47.3	33.2	19.5
1975	48.3	40.8	10.9
1976*	51.2	40.3	8.5
1977	40.4	49.6	10.0

* Includes transition quarter July-Sept., 1976

Source: Department of Army statistics.

Marital Status. Though usually uncommented upon by students of all-volunteer trends, a most dramatic change has been in the marital composition of the Army. From 1965 to 1976, as shown in Table 6, the proportion of married enlisted men increased from 36.4 to 56.9 percent. Over the same period, the average number of dependents per enlisted man increased from 1.02 to 2.47. These significant changes have occurred only since the end of the draft in 1973. The figures are all the more remarkable in that they reflect almost entirely a change in the marital composition of the junior enlisted ranks. In 1977, 43.7 percent of E-4s, the modal lower enlisted pay grade, were married. Though comparable data by pay grade are not available for the pre-Vietnam period, the number of married junior EM was certainly a much smaller fraction than current levels.

[Table 6 About Here]

The changes in the marital composition of the enlisted ranks runs directly counter to national trends. Table 7 summarizes some of the relevant data. From 1960 to 1976, the median age of males at first marriage increased by one year, and the number of never married men at age 22 rose from 51.6 to 61.1 percent. An anomaly is evident, however. The number of never married men at age 19 -- typical recruitment age -- actually decreases slightly in recent years.

[Table 7 About Here]

Table 6. MARITAL AND FAMILY STATUS OF ARMY ENLISTED MEN, 1965 AND 1976.

Year	Percent Married	Number of Dependents Per Enlisted Man
1965	36.4	1.02
1976	56.9	2.47

Source: Department of Defense statistics.

Table 7. MARITAL STATUS OF AMERICAN MALES.

Year	Median Age at First Marriage	Percent Never Married, Age 19	Percent Never Married, Age 22
1960	22.8	87.1	51.6
1970	23.2	89.9	52.3
1976	23.8	87.9	61.6

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-20, No. 306,
pp. 1-3.

The anomaly revealed by the census data on marriage rates -- generally later marriages coexisting with an increase in 19-year-old marriages -- is striking because it parallels the previously described educational data -- generally rising educational levels accompanied by an increase in the high-school dropout rate for 19-year-old white males. These anomalies in the census data suggest, in effect, that we now have two quite different youth *groups* within the white population. One group, the numerical majority with middle-class origins or aspirations, is characterized by increasing educational attainment and later marriage. The other group, with declining educational levels and propensity to enter young marriages, seems headed toward a marginal position both in class and culture terms. It is from this latter white group, along with racial minorities, that the all-volunteer Army has been overrecruiting. ✓

Women. Perhaps no change in the makeup of the all-volunteer force has received as much media attention as the growing numbers and role of women soldiers. A strong argument could be made that it has been the sharp rise in the number of female entrants, nearly all of whom possess high school diplomas, which has been the margin of success in the all-volunteer Army. As given in Table 8, the proportion of women in the enlisted ranks has climbed from .9 percent in 1964 to 6.7 percent in 1977. The racial composition of enlisted women -- 24.2 percent black in 1977 -- is equivalent with that of enlisted men. Table 9 shows females account for about eight to nine percent of all enlisted accessions in recent years. This is slightly below the ten percent female of its active strength which the Army envisions in the next five years. A Brookings Institution study, however, has estimated that close to a quarter of all

enlisted personnel could be female without major changes in current assignment policies.¹³

[Table 8 About Here]

[Table 9 About Here]

The increasing utilization of women in the all-volunteer Army is an indisputable fact. Starting in the early 1970s virtually every occupational specialty has been opened up to women except those in the combat arms. There has also been an elimination of discriminatory practices: in 1971, the Army lifted its ban on the enlistment of married women; in 1973, a Supreme Court decision required that married women in the military get the same family allowances that married men have long received; in 1975, the Army dropped its policy of discharging women soldiers who became mothers; and in 1976, the minimum 18-year-old enlistment age for women was lowered to 17 -- the same as that for men.

The crux of the issue remains the prohibition of women in the combat arms. Congressional statute presently bans women from duty on combat aircraft and ships, a principle which has been codified into Army regulations pertaining to exclusion of females from the ground combat arms. Leaving aside the considerable normative and organizational difficulties in the employment of women in the combat arms, a removal of the ban cannot be viewed as a solution to all-volunteer recruitment. There are already indications that the available pool of highly qualified women is being tapped close to its maximum. More im-

Table 8. FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY, SELECTED YEARS.

Year	Percent Female	
	Officers	Enlisted
1964	3.4	.9
1973	3.7	2.4
1975	4.9	6.1
1977	5.7	6.7

Source: Department of Defense statistics.

Table 9. FEMALE PROPORTION OF ARMY ENLISTEES.

Fiscal Year	Percentage Female
1973	4.5
1974	7.7
1975	9.1
1976*	8.0
1977	8.2

* Includes transition quarter July-Sept., 1976.

Source: U.S. Army Recruitment Command.

portant, it is highly unlikely, to say the least, that women will show any greater eagerness than men to join the combat arms.

Service Differences. The Army, of course, is not the only service competing for qualified people in the all-volunteer era. It suffers, moreover, by being identified as the least attractive service by those high school males who are most qualified for military service. Youth surveys consistently show the most positive evaluations are given to the Air Force, followed in order, by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.¹⁴ The Army, thus, starts out as the most handicapped service in the recruitment effort. This state of affairs is reflected in a comparison of the average proportion of high school graduates among NPS male entrants since 1973: about 90 percent for the Air Force, 75 percent for the Navy, 60 percent of the Marines, and 55 percent for the Army. ✓

All the services, with the partial exception of the Air Force, have encountered recruitment difficulties since the end of the draft. A 1977 market research study concluded: "It is apparent that it is becoming increasingly more difficult to attract people to enlisted in the armed services."¹⁵ More telling, each of the services been plagued by shockingly high attrition rates. Close to forty percent of servicemen, in each of the services, do not complete their initial enlistments and, instead, are discharged for disciplinary problems, personality disorders, or job inaptitude. The majority of these losses occur six months after service entry. In some ways it may be the all-volunteer Navy which is confronting the most severe problems. Recruiters publically bemoan that many high school graduates seeking to join the Navy simply cannot read at acceptable levels.¹⁶ Moreover, the Navy's desertion rate in 1976 was

higher than in any previous time in its history, including the Vietnam War. The Air Force continues to remain the best situated of the services in terms of enlisted recruitment, perhaps because its enlisted force is essentially precluded from direct combat roles.

Whatever the all-volunteer parallels between the Army and the other services may be, it is the Army's social composition which most contrasts with its pre-Vietnam form. For sure the lower ranks of the peacetime Army between the wars in Korea and Vietnam were never a mirror image of America's class system. It is undeniable, however, that the all-volunteer Army is much less representative of the American middle class than was the pre-Vietnam Army. Whether or not this speaks to the success or failure of the all-volunteer Army is a separate issue. But there can be no question that since 1973 the Army has undergone a metamorphosis in its enlisted membership. The real question is how high powered commissions and well financed studies come up with the opposite conclusion.¹⁷

The demographic transition of the Army is only part of the story of the all-volunteer force. The Army and the other armed services are also undergoing changes in their public definition and institutional workings. These organizational trends in the all-volunteer military are the subject to which we now turn.

II. THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE: AN INSTITUTION OR AN OCCUPATION?

The military can be understood as an organization which maintains levels of autonomy while refracting broader societal trends. It is from this standpoint that two models -- institution versus occupation -- will be presented to describe alternative conceptions of the all-volunteer force. These models are evaluated as to which best fits current indicators. The basic hypothesis is that the American military is moving from an institutional format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation. This tendency pervades all grades but is most apparent in the enlisted ranks of the all-volunteer force. This is not to hold that such a trend is either desirable or inevitable. But only recognition of the trend can focus attention on measures which can reverse it.

The contrast between institution and occupation can, of course, be overdrawn. For reality is complicated in that the armed forces have had and will continue to have elements of both the institutional and occupational types. The typology, nevertheless, is deemed a valid way of understanding the emergent structure of the all-volunteer force. It allows for a conceptual grasp of the basic hypothesis that the overarching trend is the erosion of the institutional format and the ascendancy of the occupational model. Even though terms like institution or occupation have descriptive limitations, they do contain core connotations which serve to distinguish each from the other. For present purposes these distinctions can be set forth as follows.

An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e. a pur-

pose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. Members of an institution are often seen as following a calling. They are commonly viewed and regard themselves as being different or apart from the broader society. To the degree one's institutional membership is congruent with notions of self-sacrifice and primary identification with one's role, it will usually enjoy esteem from the larger community. Although remuneration may not be comparable to what one might expect in the economy of the marketplace, this is often compensated for by an array of social benefits associated with an institutional format as well as psychic income. When grievances are felt, members of an institution do not organize themselves into interest groups. Rather, if redress is sought, it takes the form of "one-on-one" recourse to superiors, with its implications of trust in the paternalism of the institution to take care of its own.

Military service has traditionally had many institutional features. One thinks of the extended tours abroad, the fixed terms of enlistment, liability for 24-hour service availability, frequent movements of self and family, subjection to military discipline and law, and inability to resign, strike, or negotiate working conditions. All this is above and beyond the dangers inherent in military maneuvers and actual combat operations. It is also significant that a paternalistic remuneration system has evolved in the military corresponding to the institutional model: compensation received in noncash form (e.g. food, housing, uniforms), subsidized consumer facilities on the base, payments to service members partly determined by family status, and a large proportion of

compensation received as deferred pay in the form of retirement benefits. Moreover, unlike most civilians for whom compensation is heavily determined by individual expertise, the compensation received by military members is a function of rank, seniority, and need.

An occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e. prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. Supply and demand rather than normative considerations are paramount. In a modern industrial society employees usually enjoy some voice in the determination of appropriate salary and work conditions. Such rights are counterbalanced by responsibilities to meet contractual obligations. The cash-work nexus emphasizes a negotiation between individual and organizational needs. The occupational model implies priority of self-interest rather than that of the employing organization. A common form of interest articulation in industrial -- and increasingly public employee -- occupations is the trade union.

Traditionally, the military has sought to avoid the organization outcomes of the occupational model. This in the face of repeated recommendations of governmental commissions that the armed services adopt a salary system which would incorporate all basic pay, allowances, and tax benefits into one cash payment, and which would eliminate compensation differences between married and single personnel, thus conforming to the equal-pay-for-equal-work principle of civilian occupations. Such a salary system would set up an employer-employee relationship quite at variance with military norms. Nevertheless, even in the conventional military system there has been some accommodation to

occupational imperatives. Special supplements and proficiency pay have long been found necessary to recruit and retain highly skilled enlisted personnel.

For the single-term draftee before Vietnam, the Army was also very much an institution. The selective service system was premised on the notion of citizen obligation -- a "calling" in the almost literal sense of being summoned by a local draft board -- with concomitant low salaries for junior enlisted men. It is worth remembering that from 1952 to 1964 military pay for the first two years of service -- the term of a drafted soldier -- did not rise at all! Selective service was also defended on the desirability of a broadly representative enlisted force (though this ideal was not always realized in practice). To be sure draftees by definition were serving under a form of compulsion. Yet the peacetime draftee -- underpaid, acquiring no civilian skills, not even eligible for the GI Bill -- was by all accounts the equal if not superior of his volunteer counterpart.

Although antecedents predate the appearance of the all-volunteer force, the end of the draft served as a major thrust to move the military toward the occupational model. This philosophy of military service clearly underpinned the rationale of the 1970 report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force ("Gates Commission Report").¹⁸ Instead of a military system anchored in the normative values of an institution, captured in words like "duty," "honor," "country," the Gates Commission explicitly argued that primary reliance in recruiting an armed force should be on monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards. Subsequent reports have seconded this tendency. The turn away from a socially representative enlisted force was implicitly en-

dorsed by the 1976 report of the Defense Manpower Commission.¹⁹ Perhaps the epitome of viewing the all-volunteer force as an occupation is to be found in the 1977 Rand Corporation volume on manpower in the all-volunteer force.²⁰ The Rand study advocates recruitment and retention policies by which military compensation is calibrated to supply and demand conditions in the civilian economy. Yet it is questionable to the extreme whether the market system is the way to motivate an Army or cost-benefit analyses the way to strengthen a service institution.

The system of military compensation reflects not only the so-called "X" factor -- the unusual demands of service life -- but the corporate whole of military life. The military institution is organized "vertically," whereas an occupation is organized "horizontally." To put it in as unpretentious manner as possible, people in an occupation tend to feel a sense of identity with others who do the same sort of work, and who get about the same amount of pay. In an institution, on the other hand, it is the organization where people live and work which create the sense of identity that binds them together. In the armed forces, the very fact of being part of the services has traditionally been more important than the fact that military members do different jobs. The organization one belongs to creates the feeling of shared interest, not the other way around. From this perspective, the sense of community in the military thus runs up and down, not sideways across -- religiously, racially, as well as occupationally -- as in civilian society.

Actually, the move toward making military remuneration comparable with the

civilian sector preceded the advent of the all-volunteer force. Since 1967, military pay has been formally linked to the civil service and thus, indirectly to the civilian labor market. From 1964 to 1974, average earnings in the private economy rose 52 percent while regular military compensation -- basic pay, allowance, tax advantages -- rose 76 percent for representative grade levels, such as lieutenant colonels and master sergeants.²¹ Even more dramatic, recruit pay from 1964 to 1976 increased 193 percent in constant dollars compared to 10 percent for the average unskilled laborer.²² Indeed, the Rand report mentioned above concludes that career military personnel are now better paid than their civilian counterparts.²³

Termination of the draft and the rise in military pay have been two of most visible changes in the contemporary military system, but other indicators of the trend toward the occupational model can also be noted.

Service Entitlements. Nothing has caused more alarm within the military community than actions and proposals to eliminate a host of military benefits, e.g. subsidies for commissaries, health care for dependents, government quarters for families, and major restructuring of the retirement system. The concern with "erosion of benefits" is understandable because nonpay elements make up about half of all career military compensation compared to less than 25 percent in most civilian compensation packages.²⁴ Not so well understood is that the institutional features of the military system may have been unwittingly traded off for the relatively good salaries enjoyed by military personnel in the all-volunteer force. Current dissatisfaction is great pre-

cisely because, while the military organization has moved in the direction of the occupational model, much of its membership harkens to the social supports of the older institutional format. A kind of "devil's bargain" may have been struck when military pay was geared to comparable civilian levels. There is no way that service entitlements can be maintained at past levels if military salaries are to be competitive with civilian scales.

Military Unions. The possibility that trade unionism might appear within the armed forces of the United States was barely more than a remote thought just a few years ago. Today, there are signs that such an eventuality could come to pass.²⁵ Reliance on supply-and-demand econometric analyses and monetary incentives to recruit and retain military members is quite consistent with the notion of trade unionism. Several unions, notably the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) affiliated with the AFL-CIO, have indicated an interest in organizing the military. In the fall of 1977, however, the AFGE decided, at least for the time being, not to organize the military. Also in 1977 the Department of Defense issued a new directive which, while not banning unions outright, forbade any union from engaging in collective bargaining or job actions on a military installation. Additionally, bills have been introduced in congressional sessions to prohibit any organizing activities whatsoever of the armed forces. To make military unions illegal, however, may inadvertently push organizing activities away from mainstream unions toward more politicized groups which see themselves as a continuation of the radical troop dissent movement of the Vietnam War years. In any event,

whatever the legal restrictions placed on organizing the armed forces, the underlying dynamics of the occupational ascendancy are still operative. It would seem a fair judgement to hold that developments of 1977 have only temporarily capped rather than undercut the trend toward military unionization.

Enlisted Attrition. In the pre-Vietnam Army it was considered aberrant for an enlisted man not to complete his assigned tour. During the late 1970s, however, four in ten soldiers were failing to finish their initial enlistments. The attrition phenomena is probably as much an outcome of changing policies and procedures of military separation as it is a reflection of objective changes in the quality of the entering enlisted force. Put in another way, the all-volunteer military, like industrial organizations, is witnessing the common occurrence of its members "quitting" or being "fired." In time, it is possible that a general certificate of separation will replace the present discharge classification system. Unlike an older era, there would no longer be a stigma for unsuccessful service. Such a development would make the Army that much more consistent with the civilian work model. In all but name, the all-volunteer force has already gone a long way down the road toward indeterminate enlistments.

Work and Residence Separation. A hallmark of the conventional garrison Army has been the adjacency of work place and living quarters. As late as the mid-1960s, it was practically unheard of for a bachelor enlisted man to live off post. Not only was it against regulations, but no one could afford a private rental on a draftee's pay. Today, although precise data are not

available, a reasonable estimate would be that as many as thirty percent of single enlisted people in stateside posts have apartments away from the military installation. To the increasing proportion of single EM living off post, one must add the growing number of married junior enlisted people, all of whom also live on the civilian economy. Like civilian employees, many junior enlisted personnel are now part of the early morning and late afternoon exodus to and from work. One of the outcomes of the salary raises needed for an all-volunteer Army has been the ebbing of barracks life.

The Law and the Military. From the 1950s through the 1960s, the Court of Military Appeals and the Supreme Court brought into military law most all of the procedural safeguards available to a civilian defendant while narrowing the purview of military jurisdiction.²⁶ The highwater point in this trend was the O'Callahan vs. Parker (1969) decision in which the Supreme Court struck down court-martial jurisdiction for non-service connected offenses. The significance of O'Callahan was that the off-duty or off-post soldier was to be regarded like any other citizen. Since the early 1970s, however, the Supreme Court and lower courts have emphasized the uniqueness of the armed forces and the appropriateness of its special system of courts-martial. The trend toward an occupational model, nevertheless, has continued under a different framework. In the U.S. vs. Russo (1975) and U.S. vs. Larionoff (1977), the Supreme Court applied basic contract law to the legal status of enlistments. This dovetails with the rising tendency of active-duty personnel to bring enlistment grievances into litigation. The net effect of recent court

decisions is to move toward a legal redefinition of the military from one based on traditional status toward one consistent with generally accepted contract principles.

Military Wives. In a manner of speaking, the role of institutional membership in the military community extended to the wife of the service husband. (It was only in 1960 that court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents of servicemen was completely ended.) Wives of career personnel were expected to initiate and take part in a panoply of social functions, such as formal visits, receptions, luncheons, teas, cocktail gatherings, and dinner parties. Military wives clubs contributed funds and time to such activities as support of orphanages, hospitals, area welfare work, youth activities, and other volunteer projects. In recent years, however, there has been a perceptible heightening in the reluctance of wives at both junior officer and noncom levels to participate in such customary functions. With the rising proportion of service wives working outside the home, moreover, there are bound to be less women who have either the time or inclination to engage in the volunteer work which has structured much of the social life of military installations. It is not so much that female liberation has arrived among Army wives, though this is not absent, as it is the growing tendency for wives to define their roles as distinct from the military community.

Contract Civilians. One manifestation of recent organizational change departs entirely from formal military organization. This is the use of civilians, especially those hired on contract, to perform jobs previously

in the domain of active-duty servicemen. These tasks range from routine house-keeping and kitchen duties to quasi-combat jobs such as "tech reps" aboard warships, manning missile warning systems in Greenland, and ordnance repair and assembly in war zones such as occurred in Vietnam. From 1964 to 1978, contract-hire civilians rose from 5.4 to 14.5 percent as a proportion of total defense manpower.²⁷ Almost all of this large increase corresponded to a proportionate decline in enlisted strength from 57.3 to 48.0 percent over the same period. Presumably considerations of task efficiencies and costs bear upon decisions to substitute contract civilians for uniformed personnel.²⁸ Nevertheless, the increasing reliance on civilian employees, whose institutional affiliation with the military is attenuated, is yet another indication of the direction of organizational change in the defense establishment.

The sum of the of the above and related developments is to confirm the ascendancy of the occupational model in the all-volunteer military. This approach can be faulted for presenting too monolithic a picture of trends. There are, of course, always countervailing forces in effect. But our concern is to grasp the whole, to place the salient fact. Was it more than happenstance that the recruiting slogan used in the first years of the all-volunteer force was "Today's Army Wants to Join You!"? This carried the impression of a military organization seeking to conform to individual needs rather than the institutional ethic where individuals conform to organizational imperatives. This is not to argue that all such trends are

unwelcome. It is to say that a major transformation is occurring within the all-volunteer Army -- in terms of social organization as well as social composition -- which has not generally been appreciated by policy makers or the citizenry at large.

III. THE ENLISTED CULTURE

To generalize about the enlisted culture of the Army may seem to be an act of sinning bravely. It goes without saying that the Army encompasses a wide range of locales and people. Even within like units, soldiers may find themselves in companies ranging from "route-step" outfits (a term which has generalized from noncadence marching to describing anything slipshod or sloppy), to units -- "strak" seems to be the new term -- where the organizational climate is conducive to both mission effectiveness and high morale. This account is a reflection of having spent most of my professional life studying soldiers, a group of men -- and lately women as well -- whose company I have always treasured. Ever since my own enlisted days twenty years ago, I have lived in with soldiers on more occasions and in more places than I can remember. The reaction soldiers have accorded a sometimes too persistent guest has nearly always been one of openness and, most often, good fellowship as well.

In the summer of 1977, I was again privileged to have an extended visit with American soldiers, this time in Germany with the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR). Besides talking to literally hundreds of soldiers throughout Germany, I conducted an attitudinal survey of junior enlisted men in three line battalions. More important, I was able to lead the life of a soldier -- as much as any middle-aged outsider could -- and to interact informally with the men on many levels: in the barracks, in the field, in their work capacities, and off duty. What follows is a sociological interpretation of

enlisted life in line units of the all-volunteer Army. Nearly all appraisals of the all-volunteer Army have failed to deal with the social context of the ordinary soldier who serves in it. This account is an attempt to correct that imbalance.

One overriding impression of Army life in 1977 is the decided change for the better since 1973. The recovery of USAREUR especially over that period is an achievement of no small measure. But it would be misguided to use -- as is the custom of most observers -- the years just before and after the end of the war in Vietnam as a sole reference point. If the more appropriate peacetime period of the early 1960s is used as a benchmark, comparisons of soldierly behavior and performance are less favorable.

On the job, most importantly in the field, things get done. The impact of the newly instituted Skill Qualification Test (SQT), which combines hands-on and written examinations, has had a positive impact on training and promotion procedures. There is, however, a growing feeling -- and only some of it can be put down to normal grouching -- that too much is being asked for (and still being given) in too little time. It is not so much that "shamming" (today's GI term for avoiding work) is hard to carry off as it may be that the all-volunteer Army is causing an excessive workload in cutting back its administrative and support services. For conscientious soldiers at all ranks, hours are appallingly long.

In the barracks, the edge of violence which characterized many line units in the early 1970s has largely receded. Barracks crime is a problem, how-

ever, though some of this is because there is more to steal from today's better paid soldier than there was from the peacetime draftee. A level of raucousness, if not rowyness, does exist which exceeds the decibel count and temper of the pre-Vietnam Army. Not that the drafted peacetime Army was a sanctuary of decorum, but the tone of barracks life is no longer modulated by conventional middle-class standards as it was a decade or so ago. The youth with a stable job in his future or bound for college is much less likely to be found in today's enlisted force than in times past. In particular, the college-educated enlisted man, often from leading universities, has all but vanished from the ranks. The days when many enlisted men might be better educated than their sergeants has gone, to the dismay, surprisingly, of many senior non-coms. A visitor is struck by the fond reminiscences the older sergeants have for the university graduates who worked under them.

One source of discontent which exists in the all-volunteer Army has no real parallel in the peacetime draft Army. This is post-entry disillusionment resulting from expectations as to what the military would offer. The peacetime draftee never held high expectations as to what he would encounter and therefore was not unpleasantly surprised; indeed, he might often -- at least in hindsight -- find the Army favorable on its own terms. In all-volunteer recruitment, however, a consistent theme has been the stress -- out of necessity, to be sure -- on the instrumental aspects of military service, that is, what can the Army do for the recruit in the way of skill training transferable to civilian jobs. Because the new volunteer often sees the military

as a last alternative to limited chances in civilian life, he is understandably irate when his expectations are not met. The visitor is bombarded by stories -- surely with a strong dose of selective memory -- of recruitment promises not kept.

Post-entry disillusionment in the all-volunteer Army underlies many morale and disciplinary problems; it speaks directly to the excessive attrition rate. For once a soldier has decided he wants out, he will not be particular as to the kind of discharge that will accomplish the purpose (though he will regret this once again on the outside). Almost every Army ^{UNIT} at anytime will have an individual or two ²itering around waiting to be processed for premature separation. The effect of this on border line soldiers is incalculable, but it most certainly pushes some across the line toward an early out. Although the all-volunteer concept shies away from it, the irreconcilable dilemma is that many Army assignments -- mostly, but not exclusively in the combat arms -- do not and cannot have transferability to civilian jobs.

When serving overseas in Germany, post-entry disillusionment is often aggravated. Many soldiers, rightly or wrongly, believe they were misled as to the length of their USAREUR tour. A three- or four-year volunteer will typically serve 30-36 months in Germany when assigned to USAREUR. My own observations as well as survey data collected by the Army Research Field Unit in USAREUR show convincingly that there is a severe decline in soldier morale around the end of the second year in Germany. It should be remembered that the somewhat idealized draftee, recollected by USAREUR senior noncoms, served only 18 months in Germany. Also, it is hard to deny that the new volunteer

EM is less likely to take advantage of travel opportunities in Europe than his drafted counterpart. Where a quasi-touristic ambience characterized the draftee peer culture, the all-volunteer soldier is more likely to berate the "rads" (Germans) and harken to teenage life back in the United States. As a kind of loose measure of the growing isolation of soldiers in Germany, I have noticed over the years a decreasing amount of German phrases in everyday GI language.

The soldier's reluctance to get out of the kaserne is often laid to the fact that, unlike the draftee of an earlier period, today's volunteer soldier is no longer relatively affluent compared to German civilians. In the past few years, especially, the declining value of the dollar relative to the mark has made German duty even more costly. Yet, when all is said and done, the actual buying power of today's GI in Germany (in light of pay raises since 1968) is comparable to that of the draftee of a decade or two ago. Directly to the point, even the excellent and inexpensive "Ree Center" tours are often cancelled because of underscription. Also revealing, the typical soldier will save money not to travel in Europe, but to buy an inordinately expensive stereo system -- the big souvenir he will take back to America -- and fly commercially to the United States to take his 30-day leaves back home. ✓

Wherever stationed, soldiers' complaints about Army haircut regulations are endemic. Few soldiers, however, argue for complete removal of haircut restrictions. The consensus is that haircuts ought conform to moderate civilian styles, that is, down to the collar and over the ears. Some of the hair-

cut griping is pro forma, but there is also the reality that present Army haircuts can put the GI at a disadvantage in meeting women. Also, as one soldier put it, "If we are supposed to be representatives of our country, why can't our hair look like our Congressmen?" (Even though my own pate has been likened to that of Telly Savalas, I have no satisfactory answer to that question.)

Like civilian youth, marijuana (hashish in Germany) usage is widespread among young enlisted men. Accurate figures are difficult to come up with, but when queried as to how many of their fellow enlisted men regularly smoked marijuana (defined as at least once a week), the estimates ranged between 50 and 80 percent. Even if one discounts these figures somewhat, marijuana use is much less covert than it used to be. Men would smoke it (off duty) in my presence even after I declined to join them. Though unit policies vary greatly, the unofficial trend is for senior noncoms and company grade officers to be officially concerned with marijuana only when it interferes with duty performance or is the cause of barracks troubles. This may in fact be the most pragmatic way to deal with what is almost a cultural trait among young people. Marijuana stories of both a humorous and empathetic nature are becoming part of service lore, much like that already found in the retelling of alcoholic incidents. (One example of latrine graffiti bears repeating: "Getting promoted in the Army is like sucking a joint . . . The harder you suck, the higher you get!")

The situation regarding hard drugs is quite different. One can still sadly read, several times a month it seems, the brief reports in the Stars

and Stripes of a PFC or SP4 found dead in his bunk, the reading between the lines being that of an overdose fatality. Yet, almost surely, heroin usage has declined markedly over the past few years, although it still presents a problem in certain units. (Personal contacts in the ranks claim the less addictive cocaine is on the rise, however.) Significantly, in a group of surveyed soldiers, over 90 percent favored the legalization of marijuana while only a very few wanted to legalize heroin. The social acceptance of amphetamines and barbituates is less clearcut though they appear to fall somewhere between heroin and marijuana.

Although the military, as in civilian society, will continue to confront an illegal drug problem into the foreseeable future, excessive alcohol use is of greater command concern, and properly so. One does have the strong impression that the consumption of alcoholic beverages is higher than in years past, no mean statement; and that one runs across more twenty-year-old reformed alcoholics than there used to be. The USAREUR response to alcohol and drug abuse has been particularly well conceived in its Community Drug and Alcohol Assistance programs, the new Alcohol Treatment Center set up in 1977, and the broadly gauged moral reinvigoration activities of the Community Life Program. Just to name such programs is to indicate some of the features -- not entirely attributable to the all-volunteer force, of course -- in enlisted life and command concerns in today's Army.

A welcome improvement in the Army since the Vietnam era is the noticeable reduction -- though by no means absence -- of interracial tension among the

troops. Informal groupings by race are still the rule off duty, but not nearly as rigid as several years ago. One good unobtrusive measure of the relaxation in race relations is the much greater frequency of mixed groups to eat together in dining facilities than before. Although far from perfect, the armed forces have gone further in attacking racism than any other institution in American society. These endeavors must be pursued with the fullest vigor and there must be a continuing monitor of all sources of institutional racism such as bias in promotions, assignment, and punishment. Equal Opportunity and Race Relations instruction is to be commended for both its practical and symbolic importance. (Though one unexpected consequence of such instruction may be to heighten the soldier's sense of inequity in other areas, for example, female soldier prerogatives, Navy facial hair regulations, officer and noncom perquisites, civilian amenities.)

My conversations, however, quickly revealed that many black soldiers still perceive certain "racist" features in military life, and many white soldiers perceive "reverse prejudice" in the military. Occupying somewhat of a midposition are Hispanic soldiers who see themselves as the most dutiful and least complaining, and thereby most likely to be selected for menial details. Though we should be alert to these sentiments, they should be placed in the context that an overwhelming majority of surveyed soldiers -- six of seven blacks, and three of four whites and Hispanics -- favor serving in racially integrated units.

The recent improvement in the racial climate of the Army, however, must

be qualified by a potentially calamitous omen. I detected a degree of latent klanism among some white enlisted men. A few would show me klan cards in their wallets (in USAREUR acquired from Americans in German railroad stations, in the United States from klansmen at bus terminals). It would be erroneous to view latent klanism as a form of "white backlash." The potential emergence of klan activity in the Army -- it has already come into the open in the Marine Corps -- would derive more from social composition than reactions to equal opportunity policies within the military. We remember from the earlier presentation of demographic data that all-volunteer recruitment -- in addition to a large number of blacks -- was drawing disproportionately from white high school dropouts. Could it be that the all-volunteer Army is attracting a segment of white youth more than normally susceptible to klan-like appeals? (On the same score, what is to be made of the small number of white satanic cultists one comes across in some Army units?)

To fill its ranks, the all-volunteer Army has recruited an increasing number of young men who have wives or will marry soon after joining. Under long standing policies, the military does not pay transportation for wives of most men under the rank of sergeant, nor does it provide them with low-cost housing on military bases. All service dependents are eligible for post privileges, however. Just about every Army post in the United States today is ringed by trailer camps or shoddy apartment complexes where most of the young marrieds live an existence close to the poverty line. In USAREUR, problems are compounded when young marrieds live on the German economy where they

face cultural isolation as well as financial distress. It is a sign of the times that in 1976 alone, the Deutsche Bundespost reported that American soldiers living on the economy with their families left behind \$11,000,000 in telephone debts!²⁹ The convenience and abuse of direct dialing to the United States by lone some spouses undoubtedly explain these gigantic arrears.

It is somewhat beside the point whether or not many of these young soldiers should have ever been married in the first place. It is to the point, however, that the Army is going to encounter more and more young marrieds ✓ whose considerable marital problems affect soldierly performance. Proposals to authorize command sponsorship for lower-ranking enlisted families must be well thought out lest they be counterproductive. A recurrent topic among single soldiers, only half in jest, is to get married in order to move out of the barracks. The paradox is that while young married soldiers confront special problems precisely because they are married, single soldiers often see marriage as a way of avoiding night details, being less liable for personal inspections, and a way of obtaining more privacy. Improvement of the situation of young marrieds deserves utmost attention, but in the long run it would be best to consider ways to reduce the proportion of married soldiers in the lower enlisted ranks.

Relations between Enlisted Men, Nonesoms, and Officers. It is a truism that the link between the individual soldier and the Army system is the non-commissioned officer. Enlisted/nonesom relations, however, have undergone important shifts in modern Army history. During World War II, the overriding

organizational cleavage was that between enlisted men (including sergeants) and officers. This has been attested to by sources as varied as James Jones' brilliant novel, From Here to Eternity, the war cartoons of Bill Mauldin, the monumental surveys reported in the volumes of The American Soldier, as well as the personal experiences of countless soldiers.

During the peacetime years between Korea and Vietnam another cleavage appeared, this one within the lower enlisted ranks. The "US" versus "RA" distinction arose; US was the prefix of the service number of the drafted soldier while RA signified a regular Army volunteer. The US versus RA distinction also overlay differences between higher educated draftees and lower educated volunteers. The term RA was used by draftees as a negative adjective to describe compliance with Army rituals, or to denigrate those seen as not being able to get a decent job in civilian life.

During the Vietnam War, the NCO became the prime object of enlisted animus. In the Vietnam era, moreover, EM/NCO strain could typically override that between enlisted men and officers. Whereas the pejorative term in World War II was "the brass" connotating an officer, the equivalent expression in the Vietnam period was "lifer," almost always a senior noncom. Another organizational difference between World War II and the war in Vietnam was that in the earlier conflict men served for duration regardless of how they entered the service; thus NCOs were often draftees themselves. In the more recent war, on the other hand, virtually all noncoms were reenlistees.

In the all-volunteer Army, yet another pattern has emerged. There has

been a reinvigoration of the noncom role. Much of this change can be attributed to the payoff of Army policies which have explicitly sought to emphasize the responsibilities, recognition, and professionalization of the non-commissioned officer. The prevailing antagonism of lower ranking soldiers toward NCOs, moreover, is noticeably lower than five or ten years ago. At the same time, EM/officer friction has become more pronounced with occasional insolence toward company grade officers. This is in the context that the educational gap between officers and enlisted men is at its widest in modern times.

Noncoms also have some general complaints in the all-volunteer Army: a sense that the Army is too hyper and seeking to operate in an error free environment, a belief that there is too much diversion from regular training to civilian education and personnel problems, a feeling that there is over-direction by officers in the work setting and not enough in the barracks, a view that the military justice system can work to the disadvantage of the enforcer of discipline rather than of the offender, and a concern that the quality of clerks is deteriorating (with resultant snafus in the processing of promotion lists, notifications of transfers, school assignments, and equipment requisitions). Most important, there is the real concern with erosion of service entitlements. Discussion of military unions with career sergeants reveals a curious ambivalence. When thinking of the military mission and the chain of command, the NCO finds the notion of unions abhorrent. But when looking at diminishing entitlements and a perceived lack of societal appreciation, trade unionism becomes a more congenial option. The public definition

of the military is one which will have profound consequences on the career soldier's self-definition.

Women Soldiers. While standing at a USAREUR bus stop by the Heidelberg PX, I struck up a conversation with a woman Specialist Four. She remarks, in passing, that she is proud, unlike many of the men in her company, when the Star-Spangled Banner is played at USAREUR movie theaters. Obviously bright, she has just been given an early promotion and is thinking to make the Army a career. A young soldier in the company of his wife and pre-school daughter also arrive to wait for the bus. The little girl eyes the woman soldier and says to her parents that she wants to join the Army when she grows up. The father retorts in earshot of all, "Only funny women join the Army." My acquaintance is furious but pretends not to hear. Such a vignette captures some of the perplexities of the role of women in the all-volunteer Army.

The increasing participation of women, despite some resistance, has been one of the most important developments in the all-volunteer force. Had it not been for the low quality of many male volunteers, however, it is unlikely that the acceptance of women would have gone as far as it has. Women get the same pay for the same rank. They are trained just as rigorously as the men are. They are, however, excluded from the Army's purpose for being: combat. This means they cannot advance to the highest ranks and that they are sparse, even at comparatively low levels of command, from most of the decision-making processes. Nevertheless, for enlisted women, as for enlisted men, failure to enter command positions is not a salient issue. Still the clear trend is

toward opening up more and more positions for women soldiers. In December, 1977, yet another barrier fell when women were allowed into combat brigade headquarters and firing jobs in air defense units.³⁰ It is tacitly acknowledged, moreover, that in the event "the balloon goes up" in Western Europe, women soldiers are already in positions where they would definitely suffer casualties.

Three reasons are usually given to explain why women are barred from combat units. The first is that our cultural norms will not accept women dying in battle. Leaving aside whether or not a dead body retains any gender significance, the fact is that we have already crossed that line in our present deployment of women soldiers. Second, it is argued that women do not possess the physical strength required for the heavy labor of ground combat. Yet women have performed gruelling labor on many occasions; and have even taken part in ground combat in other times and places, albeit not as a common occurrence. That many soldiers feel women skirt full responsibilities and that the men end up with added labor, more doubling of their workloads, and late night shifts, may speak more to policy and desire than to innate capabilities. Third, there is the issue of eroticism in having mixed sexes living together in close circumstances. That, in view of the integration that has taken place elsewhere in the Army, should not be an insurmountable problem. We also have evidence that women receive good marks in field maneuvers.³¹ (There are, however, the underground rumors of rapes and special guard details for women in the field.)

The real reason why women are excluded from the mainstream of the Army is simply there is little pressure to let them into it from either men or women. Certainly enlisted women are not clamoring for a major expansion of their numbers into the combat arms. "They also serve," seems to be their motto. It is likely, moreover, that the recruiting successes in attracting high quality women into the all-volunteer Army would be reversed if combat assignments were given females.

IV. IS A REPRESENTATIVE ENLISTED FORCE DESIRABLE?

It is no longer an empirical question that the enlisted ranks of the all-volunteer Army are much less representative of middle-class youth than the peacetime draft Army. It is, however, another kind of question whether this is good, bad, or irrelevant.

The clearest and strongest evidence bearing upon the effects of social background on soldierly performance deal with enlisted attrition.³² One of the main presumptions of the all-volunteer force was that, with longer-term enlistments and professionally committed soldiers, there would be less personnel turnover than in a military system which was heavily dependent upon on draftees and draft-motivated volunteers. This has turned out not to be the case. Personnel turnover has increased at such a pace that the all-volunteer force is becoming something of a revolving door for many of its entrants. Five years after the end of conscription, the Army, along with the other armed services, is confronting an unacceptably high rate of enlistees -- four out of ten -- who do not complete their first term of service.

The data given in Table 10 present attrition rates by educational and mental aptitude levels. The striking finding is that high school graduates are almost twice as likely than high school dropouts to complete their enlistments. Most revealing, this finding is virtually unchanged when mental aptitude is held constant. High school graduates from the lower aptitude levels are actually much more likely to finish their tours than high school dropouts in the higher aptitude levels. Supplementary data from 1972-74 which

make black-white breakdowns indicate that overall attrition rates between the races are comparable, with the exception that blacks in the lower aptitude levels do better than their white counterparts.³³

[Table 10 About Here]

Other measures of soldierly performance, such as enlisted productivity and low disciplinary actions, show precisely the same correlates as found for attrition rates.³⁴ High school graduates significantly outperform high school dropouts, higher mental levels do better than lower mental levels, but education is a much more powerful predictor than mental aptitude. Possession of a high school diploma, it seems, reflects the acquisition of social traits (work habits, punctuality, self-discipline) which make for a more successful Army experience. The conclusion is inescapable. The all-volunteer Army will be better served by attracting more high school graduates or, even better, college bound youth, that is, a more representative cross-section of American young men.

Despite the overwhelming evidence that the higher the quality, the better is soldierly performance, one too often hears the statement that there are many manual tasks for which bright soldiers are less suited than the not so bright. Or as it has been put more formally: "Higher-mental aptitude individuals may become very dissatisfied in [minimal ability] jobs because of lack of challenge."³⁵ This assertion has a surface plausibility and it also has the added attraction of making a virtue out of a necessity in the all-

Table 1G. ARMY ATTRITION RATES BY EDUCATIONAL AND MENTAL LEVELS (FY 1974 enlistees as of July, 1977).

	Attrition Percent By Months After Service Entry		
	3 months	12 months	36 months
Total	10.7	21.7	39.8 ✓
All High School Graduates	7.3	13.7	26.7 ✓
Mental Level:			
I-III A	5.9	11.6	24.1
IIIB	8.6	15.5	29.4
IV	9.7	17.2	29.8
All Non-High School Graduates	13.8	28.6	51.4 ✓
Mental Level:			
I-III A	12.1	26.2	49.4
IIIB	14.2	29.4	52.6
IV	15.9	31.3	52.5

Source: Department of Army statistics.

volunteer force. But it is patently contradicted by the facts. The evidence is unambiguous that on measures of enlisted productivity, higher educated and higher aptitude soldiers do better in low skill jobs as well as in high skill jobs.³⁶ This confirms what every NCO has always known.

Most of the heated discussion about representativeness has centered around the racial content of the all-volunteer force. Though some researchers studiously avoid the obvious, it is incontrovertible that there has been a sharp rise in black participation -- well over double the proportion in the general population -- in the Army's enlisted ranks. As noted earlier, the rise in black content reflects both the large increase in the proportion of blacks eligible for military service (through higher educational levels and better aptitude scores), and the unprecedentedly high unemployment rates among black youth in the 1970s. Nevertheless, to look at the racial composition of the Army solely in terms of social forces impinging upon and internal to the black community ought not foreclose attention on the participation -- or lack of it -- of the larger white middle-class population. To what degree the changing racial composition of the Army also reflects white reluctance to join a truly integrated system is unknown. We do know, however, that changing racial patterns in urban areas result almost entirely from the preference of whites to live in segregated neighborhoods.³⁷

The military has always recruited some youth, white and black, who had no real alternative job prospects. The recently advanced view that the armed forces ought be an outlet for otherwise unemployed youth, while seemingly

persuasive in the short term, is deceptive on several grounds. It fails to take into account the preponderance of minority and other disadvantaged youth in low skill enlisted jobs which have marginal, if any, transferability to civilian employment. We are also confronted with the understandable, but still disconcerting, fact that blacks are virtually identical to whites to the extent they downgrade the prestige of an occupation on the basis of the percentage of blacks in that occupation.³⁸ Moreover, with such a large proportion of volunteers -- black or white -- failing to complete their enlistments, the all-volunteer force is producing large numbers of what are, in effect, two-time losers. Rather than regarding the military as part of the marketplace economy, it would be better to redistribute less advantaged soldiers into positions requiring extended skill training with attendant longer-term commitments, and, at the same time, to draw middle-class youth into low skill occupations where short enlistments are most practical. The military, however, will continue to draw disproportionately from young blacks as long as they are victims of certain structural problems in the national economy -- specifically, the steady flow of manufacturing jobs away from cities where so many poor blacks are trapped.

The rising minority content in the Army actually masks a more pervasive shift in the social class bases of the lower enlisted ranks, a shift that became apparent in the combat arms over the course of the Vietnam war, and one that has become even more pronounced in the all-volunteer Army. From the 1940s through the mid-1960s, the military served as a bridging environment

between entering low status youth and eventual middle-class employment.³⁹ Whatever successes the military has as a remedial organization for deprived youth were largely due to the armed forces being legitimated on other than welfare grounds, e.g. national defense, citizenship obligation, even manly honor.⁴⁰ In other words, those very conditions peculiar to the armed forces which can serve to resocialize poverty youth away from a dead-end existence depend directly upon the military not being defined as a welfare agency, a definition that is hard to escape unless enlisted membership is representative of a cross-section of American youth. Present trends toward labeling the Army as a last recourse for disadvantaged youth are self-defeating for the youth involved precisely because they directly counter the premise that military participation is one of broadly based national service.

The distinctive quality of the enlisted ranks in modern times has been a mixing of the social classes. It was the conjunction of both authoritarian and egalitarian standards that produced the singular character of the enlisted experience. It was an experience derived from a social organization which underutilized -- or, if one prefer, penalized -- middle-class individuals, while simultaneously allowing persons from lower-class background to participate with minimal acknowledgement of preexisting social and educational handicaps. Such an enforced leveling of the classes had no parallel in any other existing institution in American society. This was the elemental social fact underlying enlisted service. This is the state of affairs which has disappeared in the all-volunteer Army.

An organizational comparison may be instructive at this point. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was set up in 1934 during the Depression to recruit unemployed young men for public works.⁴¹ Throughout most of the 1930s, when the CCC had a membership somewhat representative of a cross-section of men, it received enthusiastic public support from liberals and conservatives alike, and was acknowledged to have contributed greatly to the public benefit and to the individual good of the men who labored in its civilian battalions. Toward the end of the decade, however, as outside employment opportunities improved, the new enrollees were "younger, less self-reliant, and more prone to homesickness or discouragement."⁴² Dishonorable dismissals, never a problem before, became endemic; crime and violence in the camps increased; and local communities, formerly supportive, pressed for the removal of CCC camps. The CCC precedent, while not a direct precedent for the all-volunteer Army, does seem to have some transferable lessons: membership representativeness of an organization (if mass based) contributes to internal efficiency, individual growth, and public esteem.

Another consequence of the all-volunteer force speaks to ideological representativeness. A major study of active-duty servicemen in 1973-75 concluded that while there is no single "military mind," there is a consistent attitudinal break between those intending to make the military a career and those who are not.⁴³ Noncareer military personnel are very much like their civilian counterparts in attitudes toward civil-military relations and the military organization. Career military people, on the other hand, are ide-

ologically different from both their civilian counterparts and from noncareer military men. The career military "were telling us -- louder and clearer than we are accustomed to hearing -- that they were dissatisfied with present levels of military influence and preferred a good deal more."⁴⁴ The study concluded that in order to maintain a desirable political balance within the all-volunteer force, extreme caution was in order on proposals to increase the career share of the active-duty population. Quite the contrary, recruitment ought be directed at "in-and-outers," single term servicemen who would represent a broad ideological spectrum.

One of the unquantifiable aspects of combat performance is the effect of social composition on combat groups. From a historical standpoint, the evidence is clear that military participation and combat risks in World War II were more equally shared by American men than in either the wars of Korea or Vietnam.⁴⁵ (The draft per se is thus no guarantee that military participation will insure class equity.) In point of fact, soldiers in World War II reflected a higher socio-economic background than that of the general population. On the other hand, a careful study of Vietnam War casualties has documented that low social class (not race!) was the factor most responsible for the higher casualties suffered by segments of American society in that war.⁴⁶ It is informative that both supporters and critics of the American military concur that at least some of the deterioration of American troop behavior in the Vietnam War was due to the accurate perceptions of lower-ranking enlisted men that the sacrifices of war were not being equally

shared.⁴⁷

In the post-Vietnam context, if U.S. forces are to fulfill their function of military deterrence, representational concerns are still germane. This is not to argue that the makeup of the enlisted ranks be perfectly calibrated to the social composition of the larger society, but it is to ask what kind of society excuses its privileged from serving in the ranks of its Army. If participation of persons coming from minority or blue-collar background in military leadership positions is used as a measure of democratic character, it is even more important that participation of more advantaged groups in the Army's rank and file also be a measure of representational democracy.

V. SERVING IN THE RANKS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

The time is ready to reassess our stock of knowledge regarding the all-volunteer Army. Such a reassessment must be based on clear analysis of five years of experience and future probabilities. It ought not be constrained by policy alternatives -- the status quo versus bringing back conscription -- which dominate debate on the all-volunteer force. What considerations must be raised in determining who should serve and what kind of an enlisted force is desirable? What are the relations between citizen participation and national security? Econometrically based analyses tend not ask these kind of questions, but we must.

Let us summarize the discussion of this study up to this point. The all-volunteer Army has its difficulties but it is working. The Recruiting Command has managed an accomplishment of immense proportions. In comparison with the peacetime draft, however, today's Army is much less representative -- and becoming increasingly so -- of American youth. Accompanying major demographic changes, there has also been a shift away from organizational factors conducive to an institutional framework toward one more resembling that of an occupation. A more representative enlisted force will have beneficial consequences for the Army in terms of military efficiency, enlisted life in the ranks, and civic definition. Most troubling, even at present levels of quality and numbers, recruitment will become progressively more difficult as the cohort of eligible enlistees drops rapidly over the next decade.

Present and anticipated difficulties to recruit an all-volunteer Army have led to renewed talk of restoring conscription. This possibility is viewed as remote. The passions and injustices of the Vietnam years lie too close to the surface. It is indisputable that public opinion polls show an overwhelming support for the all-volunteer concept.⁴⁸ A return to the draft would also pose anew the question of who serves when not all serve. Coercive induction might well result in troop discipline problems exceeding what the Army could accommodate. If compulsion is used, moreover, many will attempt to avoid military service, which will bring on its own problems. Practical as well as political considerations foreclose the draft as a real alternative in the foreseeable future.

Granting conscription is not feasible, what about management steps that could be taken to improve manpower utilization within the all-volunteer framework? Here we run into the difficulty that most proposals in this vein -- a kind of sub-optimal approach -- do not address the core issue: getting young men into the ground combat arms. Neither lowering physical standards for men, nor increasing the number of women suit the imperatives of the combat arms. Similarly, greater reliance on civilian personnel does not speak as to who serves in the infantry. That increasing the proportion of women, civilians, or less physically qualified men in technical support units will result in releasing more soldiers for assignment into the combat arms is questionable in the long term. What would probably happen is that the all-volunteer Army will experience even greater recruitment and attrition problems

among its male soldiers than presently.

Large raises in military pay were the principal rationale of the Gates Commission to induce persons to join the all-volunteer force. This has turned out to be a double-edged sword, however. Youth surveys show that high pay motivates less qualified youth (e.g. high school dropouts, those with poor grades) to join, while having a negligible effect on more qualified youth.⁴⁹ Better qualified youth, in fact, have a higher estimate of military compensation than do lesser qualified youth.⁵⁰ To use salary incentives as the primary motivating force to join and remain in the military can also lead inadvertently to grave morale problems. If future military pay raises were to lag behind civilian scales, as seems likely, the present grumbling throughout the ranks now limited to perceived erosion of benefits would then become a rumbling chorus of complaint.

The central issue remains: is there a way without direct compulsion or excessive salaries by which a large and representative cross-section of young men can be attracted into the combat arms? Or, to put it in another way, can we obtain the analog of the peacetime draftee in the all-volunteer framework? I believe there is. Two proposals are presented for consideration: one moderate, the other more far reaching.

The first proposal is a two-year enlistment option (the term of the draftee) to be restricted to the combat arms (and perhaps labor intensive fields) and be oriented toward an overseas tour. The quid pro quo for such assignment would be post-service educational benefits along the lines of the

G.I. Bill of World War II. A college-education-in-exchange-for-two-years-in-the-combat-arms formula would be the means to attract highly qualified soldiers who can learn quickly, serve effectively for a full tour, and then be replaced by similarly qualified recruits.⁵¹ The added costs of generous post-service educational benefits would be partly balanced by budgetary savings in reduced recruiting outlays, less attrition, less time diverted from military training, and, most likely, fewer dependents of lower ranking soldiers. Such educational benefits would be limited solely to those serving in the combat arms, about a quarter of all enlisted personnel in the Army. (Corresponding formulas could be worked out for the other services.)

Arguments that enlisted occupations in the modern Army demand long terms because of time invested in skill training do not stand up to scrutiny. Close to half of all lower-ranking enlisted jobs do not require more than a couple of months of advanced training beyond basic.⁵² Moreover, because there would be no presumption of acquiring civilian skills in the military, the terms of such short-term service would be unambiguous, thus alleviating a major source of enlisted discontent in the all-volunteer Army.

To go a step farther, the military could set up a two-track personnel system recognizing a distinction between a citizen soldier and a career soldier ("soldier" is used here inclusively for airmen, sailors, and marines, as well). The career soldier would be assigned and compensated in the manner of the prevailing system. The citizen soldier, however, would serve a two-year term in the combat arms or labor intensive occupations with low

active-duty salary, few if any entitlements, but with deferred compensation in the form of post-service educational benefits. Such educational benefits could be tied to military obligations following active duty and thus bolster our sagging reserve forces. There is some evidence that many highly qualified youth would choose a short term in the military under such conditions.⁵³

The second and broader proposal assumes the definition of military service needs overhauling as badly as the machinery of selection.⁵⁴ Now is the time to consider a voluntary national service program -- in which military duty is one of several options -- which would be a prerequisite for future federal employment. For purposes of discussion, a two-year national service program aimed at youth -- male and female -- is proposed. Such service would be expected to take place between school and job, or between school and college, or between college and professional training. National service would be compensated for at levels comparable to that given draftees in the pre-Vietnam era. That is, subsistence plus a little spending money. It would be directed toward tasks which intrinsically are unamenable to sheer monetary incentives, as diverse as caring for the aged, infirm, and mentally feeble; performing conservation work, as well as serving in the combat arms of the armed forces. It would certainly be to the advantage of society to have such tasks performed by low paid but motivated youth. But at the same time such tasks need not be considered a lifetime vocation. In fact, for many in their late teens and early twenties a diversion from the world of school or work would be tolerable and perhaps even welcome.

Certainly a national service plan would cause a readjustment of national priorities. Much discussion is needed on the manner in which the implementation and details of such a program could be worked out. But the core of the proposal is that there ought be some linkage between, on the one hand, national service, and, on the other, future eligibility for government employment. There will be a reliance on neither compulsion nor altruism. Such a program has many positive implications. It would avoid the "stick" of coercion, but still appeal to a large constituency because of the "carrot" of possible employment in the governmental sector. It would meet pressing national needs in both the civilian and military spheres. It would be philosophically defensible by connecting future employment by the taxpayer to prior commitment to national service. It would make public service an essential part of growing up in America. Most important, it would clarify the military's role by emphasizing the larger calling of national service.

In a democratic society quality of life as well as life or death decisions are topics for the broadest public discussion and debate evolved through opposing views. Opinion polls, although fraught with interpretive ambiguities, do offer some reading on public attitudes. Clearly a large majority of Americans support a massive defense establishment while opposing a return to military conscription. Yet these same polls show two out of three Americans favor a year of compulsory national service for males; 40 percent favor such a program for women. Even among young men aged 18 to 24, almost half support the idea and 43 percent would choose military rather than

civilian service.⁵⁵ It may be that we are coming to a realization that many of the things we need as a nation we can never afford to buy. If we are to have them, we must give them to ourselves.

The debate about the all-volunteer Army is a continuation of the discussion that surrounded the end of the draft. The primacy of democratic politics does not only mean the tasks of the armed forces are defined by elected leaders, but it also demands an appropriate public forum concerning the positioning of the military in its historical, social, and moral context. The all-volunteer Army has been presented as either a failure or a success. Events unfolding today indicate plainly that it is neither.

FOOTNOTES

1. The concept of "qualified and eligible" was first introduced in Martin Binkin and John D. Johnston, All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems and Prospects. Report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).

2. Richard V.L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica, Calif.: 1977), p. 189.

3. Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 1 (1974), pp. 109-124; Alvin J. Schexnider and John Sibley Butler, "Race and the All-Volunteer System: A Reply to Janowitz and Moskos," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 2 (1976), pp. 421-432; Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 160-164; Cooper, op. cit., pp. 209-221.

4. Army Times, June 27, 1977, p. 40.

5. Ibid., Sept. 5, 1977, p. 11

6. Ibid., June 13, 1977, p. 32.

7. Cooper, op. cit., pp. 209-216.

8. Information Please Almanac (N.Y.: Golenpaul, 1976), p. 739.

9. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command obtains the distribution of high school graduates by race from a separate data source; therefore these distributions may not exactly correspond to other NPS male data.

FOOTNOTES (continued):

10. See, for example, Allan Chase, The Legacy of Malthus (N.Y.: Knopf, 1977), pp. 432-447.
11. Cooper, op. cit., p. 213.
12. John Sibley Butler, "Inequality in the Military," American Sociological Review, Vol. 41 (1976), pp. 807-818.
13. Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach, Women and the Military (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 105.
14. Market Facts, Youth Attitude Tracking Study (Chicago: Market Facts, 1977), p. 142.
15. Ibid., p. 12.
16. New York Times, Dec. 8, 1977, p. 18.
17. Prominent examples of this myopia follow. "There is no evidence to suggest that the armed forces are now or are in danger of becoming a 'poor man's Army'.", Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 167; "The evidence presented here thus shows that the American military has not or is becoming an army of the poor or the black.", Cooper, op. cit., p. 231.
18. The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).
19. Defense Manpower Commission, op. cit., pp. 167-172.
20. Cooper, op. cit., pp. 356-380.
21. Steven L. Canby and Robert A. Butler, "The Military Manpower Question," in William Schneider, Jr., and Francis P. Hoerber, eds., Arms, Men, and Military Budgets (N.Y.: Crane, Russak, 1976), pp. 186-187.

22. Tulay Demirles, "Adjusted Consumer Price Index for Military Personnel and a Comparison of Real Civilian and Military Earnings, 1964-1973," Technical Memorandum, TM-1200 (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 1974), p. 9.

23. Cooper, op. cit., pp. 376-380.

24. Ibid., p. 379.

25. The literature on military unions, non-existent a few years ago, is rapidly growing. See, for example, Ezra S. Krendel and Bernard L. Samoff, eds., Unionizing the Armed Forces (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., Blue-Collar Soldiers (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1977); William J. Taylor, Jr., Roger J. Arango, and Robert S. Lockwood, eds., Military Unions (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977).

26. This capsule summary of the law and the military is taken from James B. Jacobs, "The Impact of Legal Change on the United States Armed Forces Since World War II," paper presented at the meetings of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 20-22, 1977.

27. Cooper, op. cit., p. 11.

28. A comprehensive discussion of the expansion of the civilian component in the defense system is Martin Binkin with Herschel Kanter and Rolf Clark, Shaping the Defense Civilian Work Force. Study prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

FOOTNOTES (continued)

29. International Herald Tribune, Aug. 3, 1977, p. 3.
30. Army Times, Jan. 2, 1978, p. 1
31. Ibid., Jan. 16, 1978, p. 4.
32. An overview of the attrition phenomena is found in H. Wallace Sinaiko, ed., First Term Enlisted Attrition, Proceedings of a Conference held at Leesburg, Virginia, April 4-7, 1977.
33. A.J. Martin, "Trends in DOD First-Term Attrition," in Sinaiko, ed., Ibid., pp. 20-21.
34. On the correlates of formal educational and mental aptitude levels on enlisted productivity and disciplinary actions, see Cooper, op. cit., p. 131.
35. Ibid., p. 132.
36. Ibid., p. 139.
37. Reynolds Farley, et al., "Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs," Social Science Research, 1978, in press.
38. Paul M. Siegel, "Occupational Prestige in the Negro Subculture," Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 40 (1970), pp. 156-171.
39. Harley L.S. Browning, Sally C. Lopreato, and Dudley L. Poston, Jr.s, "Income and Veteran Status," American Sociological Review, Vol. 38 (1973), pp. 74-85; Sally C. Lopreato and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Differences in Earnings and Earnings Ability Between Black Veterans and Nonveterans in the United States," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 57 (1977), pp. 750-766; Wayne J. Villemez and John D. Kasarda, "Veteran Status and Socioeconomic Attainment," Armed Forces and

FOOTNOTES (continued):

Society, Vol. 4 (1976), pp. 407-420.

40. Bernard Beck, "The Military as a Welfare Institution," in Charles C. Moskos, Jr., ed., Public Opinion and the Military Establishment (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971), pp. 137-148.

41. Leslie Alexander Lacy, The Soil Soldiers (Radnor, Penn.: Chilton, 1976).

42. Ibid., pp. 201-202.

43. Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Bair, and David R. Segal, The All-Volunteer Force (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977).

44. Ibid., p. 135.

45. John Willis, "Variations in State Casualty Rates in World War II and the Vietnam War," Social Problems, Vol. 22 (1975), pp. 558-568; Neil D. Fligstein, "Who Served in the Military, 1940-1973," CDE Working Paper 76-8 (Madison: Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin, 1976).

46. Gilbert Badillo and G. David Curry, "The Social Incidence of Vietnam Casualties: Social Class or Race," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 2 (1976), pp. 397-406.

47. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (N.Y.: Russell Sage, 1970), pp. 135-156; Moskos, "The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 31 (1975), pp. 25-37; John Helmer, Bringing the War Home (N.Y.: Free Press, 1974), pp. 1-42; David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), pp. 28-49; Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, The Military Managers (N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1978).



FOOTNOTES (continued)

48. Chicago Sun Times, March 6, 1977, p. 34.
49. Market Facts, op. cit., pp. 125-127.
50. Ibid., p. 126.
51. An insightful discussion on the value of post-service educational benefits in lieu of active-duty pay is found in Bachman, Blair, and Segal, op. cit., pp. 145-148.
52. Cooper, op. cit., p. 140.
53. Bachman, Blair and Segal, op. cit., pp. 145-148.
54. An excellent study, containing both original thinking and factual information on the relationship between military needs and national service is William R. King, Achieving America's Goals: The All-Volunteer Force or National Service? Report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).
55. New York Times, Jan. 26, 1976, p. 22.